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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
TONY PECHARICH,
Applicant and Appellant,
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, and INDEPENDENT COAL AND
COKE COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

No. 6242

Brief of Respondents
INTRODUCTION
Respondents will not attempt in this matter to
make a statement of facts as such. Such a statement
would result merely in duplication, inasmuch as the
argument will consist almost solely of a summation
of evidence. However, Respondents enter their protest again Appellant's alleged statement of facts being
considered by the Court as such, and insist that it is
nothing more nor less than a summary of certain parts
of Appellant's case or evidence.
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Seldom, if ever, have counsel for Respondents been
before this Court on a matter wherein questions of law
played so minor a part. The Industrial Commission
had presented to it but one question of fact, namely:
did the claimant's evidence show that his disability
resulted from or was contributed to by his accident, or
did Defendant's evidence show that there was no causal
connection~
The Commission found the latter, and
under well established rules of law this Court is interested only in the question of whether or not such
decision finds its support in competent evidence.
In attempting to avoid this limitation of the problem Appellant argues that medical opinion supporting
Respondent Company's position may not be considered
sufficient to overcome lay testimony as to the actual
physiological effect of his injury. In other words, he
claims that he was a well, strong man before the injury
and that he suffered increasing disability following its
date and that no amount of opinion evidence can overcome the necessary inferences from this fact. We
answer the contention by waiving it, as we may properly do because Appellant argues from a premise not
established by the record. The record contains definite
competent evidence that claimant's condition was not
that of a well man before the accident, and that there
was no acceleration toward disability thereafter. Hence,
the Commission was still confronted with the stated
question, which it resolved, upon conflicting evidence,
in favor of the employer. We conceive it our duty and
substantially our sole duty to point out to this Court as
concisely as possible the evidence. in the record support2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ing the Commission's conclusion that Appellant's admitted disability has no causal connection with his admitted
accident.
ARGUMENT
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DECISION SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE
Appellant entered the employ of Respondent Company on or about October 15, 1936, (Defendants' Exhibit "E") being a little less than ten months prior to
the accident in question, which occurred August 6, 1937.
According to the mine foreman, George B. Jackson, it
soon became apparent that he was unable to properly
perform his work. The foreman thought at first it was
because he was lazy, but found out afterwards that he
was simply unable to do the job. This was apparent
from the time he started to work until he was finally
laid off about February 1, 1938. He was losing weight
and this inability to perform his work was gradually
becoming more pronounced, but significantly this decline
and inability was no more marked or accelerated following the accident than before. (Tr. 60-3) (Method of
Transcript reference same as Appellant's.) Apparently
loss of weight had made itself evident even before claimant commenced work for Defendant Company. He testified that his normal weight was one hundred fifty
pounds and upward. (2nd Tr. 33-4) Yet his employment card shows this weight as one hundred forty pounds
at the time he came with the Defendant Company.
(Defendants' Exhibit "E ")
3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

James Collins, a driver at the mine, formerly a face
man, likewise testified as to claimant's existing disability prior to the accident. He walked slowly and with
a limp and would leave his place of work earlier than
the rest of the men in order to reach the man trip by
the time they arrived. This condition existed before
the accident, as well as after, and the witness could
notice no difference in this respect. The shovel runners complained of his work and claimant himself
complained of his inability to travel with much of a
load. ( 3rd Tr. 53-58) In the face of this very definite
and positive testimony by men in a position to know
whereof they spoke, Appellant goes far in stating, as he
does in his brief, that before the accident he "was an
able-bodied and strong man.''
Since Appellant's disability is admittedly caused
by chronic hypertrophic arthritis of the spine, the testimony of these lay witnesses, showing a pre-existing and
gradually developing disability, becomes most significant and it becomes even more significant when we
examine the nature of his accident and resultant injury
in the light of the medical testimony. As stated in his
brief, claimant fell backward and struck his back on a
rail. He received what Dr. Robinson described as a
slight bruise or contusion. ( Tr. 40 and 45) He returned
to work at the end of a week, that is, August 13, 1937,
and continued in his employment until early in February, 1938, when he was laid off by reason of slackening
work and was not thereafter re-employed. (2nd Tr. 37)
It is interesting to note how uniformly the doctors
testifying in this case agreed that such an injury would
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not, and even rould not, cause, light up, or accelerate
an arthritic condition of the spine such as afflicted
claimant. This is the opinion of the Company doctors,
Dr. Robinson (Tr. -!1-2), Dr. Lindem (3rd Tr. 34, 37),
the claimant's 0"\\"'11 family physirian, Dr. Hubbard (Tr.
72, 79-81) and Doctors Richards and Tyree, (3rd Tr. 5,
7a, 8, 9, 17, 19, 20) appointed by the Commission to
make an examination and report on its behalf at the
request of attorneys representing the interested parties.
The only doctor who thought the accident accelerated the disease was Dr. Demman. (Tr. 89) He based
his opinion on a hypothetical question which included
the statement that claimant was healthy prior to the
accident and he stated that the only way he could connect the condition with the injury was through the history of the case given him by claimant, (Tr. 90) which,
it must be recalled, was a year and eight months after
the accident. (Tr. 87) Significantly, Dr. Demman stated
that whether the injury was of a mild or severe nature
would affect his conclusion in this matter. (Tr. 92-3)
We say significantly because testimony of the Commission's examining physician, Dr. Richards, shows most
clearly circumstances under which trauma may or may
not cause or accelerate osteoarthritis.
It is most difficult to pick out portions of Dr. Richards' testimony and thereby obtain the entire picture
essential to an understanding of his conclusion in this
matter. His statements and explanations, especially on
cross-examination, are most enlightening. In brief, he
states that this type of arthritis is slow in progress and

5
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that claimant's case had undoubtedly been of some years
standing with a gradual and constantly increasing disability. (3rd Tr. 9, 16) In order to charge an accident
with an arthritic condition the accident must not only
be of a severe or fracturing type, but it must directly
injure the bony structure in which the arthritis develops.
(3rd Tr. 10-12) This prerequisite he states is not found
in the instant case, first, because the trauma was not
severe and second, because the afflicted portion of claimant's spine, the forward or anterior, is one of the best
protected portions of the body's bony structure, difficult
of injury except by very severe trauma, of which injury
there was here no evidence. (3rd Tr. 10, 11, 15).
Although Doctors Richards and Tyree were, upon
stipulation of the parties, appointed by the Commission
as its own examining physicians, Appellant attacks their
findings on the basis that Dr. Richards is not an orthopedic surgeon. While he may not claim this as his specialty, he states: "Well, we have had in the office, the
last time I looked up the figures, fourteen hundred forty
cases of arthritis. I have seen quite a number of them
since.'' Of this large number of cases he estimates
that one-fourth involved the spine. (3rd Tr. 29) In
view of this experience and earlier spine work as a
bone specialist, Dr. Richards' qualifications and th~
weight to which his opinion is entitled seem rather definitely established. (3rd Tr. 11-12) Unfortunately, Dr.
Tyree was out of town and therefore unavailable at the
time of the final hearing. (3rd Tr. 29) But Dr. Richards
testified "Dr. Tyree went over the case with me in detail,
and agreed with everything that was said. He read the
6
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letter and said he agreed with me 100%." (3rd Tr. 17)
Since the Commission was requested to appoint for this
examination an orthopedic surgeon, we may, without
doing violence to the record, assume that Dr. Tyree
was such.
Dr. Hubbard, who was the first doctor consulted by
Appellant, following the termination of his employment
with Respondent Company, testified at length as to
Appellant's general condition, chargeable to and centering in arthritis of septic or toxic origin. (Tr. 72-4}
It was some months after this consultation before he
ever mentioned to Dr. Hubbard that he had received any
sort of injury. (Tr. 71) Dr. Hubbard likewise clearly
shows that this type of injury could have no causal connection with Appellant's condition. (Tr. 81)
The two chiropractors called by claimant testified
that in their opinion there was causal connection between the claimant's disability and his accident. Other
than the fact that this presents a conflict, we merely
observe that according to these men arthritis is always
the result of trauma and claimant's condition must have
been caused by this or some other accident. Since they
knew of no other accident they charged it to this. (Tr.
59; 3rd Tr. 48, 50) With their school of thought on this
subject the Commission apparently did not agree.
It would appear significant that while Appellant
testifies that his disability commenced in February, 1938,
when his employment with Respondent Company ceased,
he made no claim to the Commission or otherwise until
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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May, 1939, a year and three months later. It must also
be kept in mind that Appellant continued in the same
employment for six months after the accident and at
the same job and pay. (Tr. 15) His explanation for
delay in making claim is that he thought that he had
rheumatism. With that we can not quarrel, and he
probably still thinks the same, or at least should, since
every doctor and chiropractor who testified stated that
was and is his trouble. Hence, his change of attitude
must be otherwise accounted for. Obviously someone
suggested to him that the disability might be connected
with an injury suffered by him back in August, 1937.
In order to make a causal connection seem in the least
plausible, it appeared imperative that the accident in
question must have been of some substantial severity.
Appellant testified that he was knocked unconscious,
that the man working near him, Jimmy Collins, revived
him, and that the mine foreman, George Jackson, assisted him out of the mine. (Tr. 9-10) This story is positively contradicted by both Collins and Jackson. Collins
testified that he did not even know Pecharich had suffered an accident until he came back to where Pecharich
had been working, asked the shovel runner where the
track man was and was informed that he got hurt and
went home. (3rd Tr. 55, 58-9, 61-2) Jackson testified
as follows:
''A. All I know about it was, several
days after he had been - after he was off
- that they said he had fell or hurt himself. I didn't know it until I had to make
out the report, the accident report.

8
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Q. Did you have anything to do with
getting him out of the mine or getting him
to the doctor, or anything to do with him at
the time of the accident~
A.

No sir. I think he walked up.

Q. Did he ever report to you at any
time that he was having any difficulty as a
result of the accident, after he went back to
work?
A.

No sir." (Tr. 63)

Dr. Robinson said that as he recalled, Appellant had
stated to him that the accident happened about eleven
o'clock A. M., that he stopped work about an hour and
a half later and then came out of the mine. (Tr. 38)
The foregoing discussion of the evidence has been
largely confined to Respondents' case with the emphasis in relation to medical testimony on that of the non·
Company doctors, since they cannot be charged with
testifying in behalf or for the benefit of an employer.
With conflicts this Court is not concerned, as it has
stated in more than fifty of the Workmen's Compensation cases decided by it. We cite only two, one early,
one late, to the effect that this Court can neither weigh
nor review substantial competent evidence supporting
findings of the Industrial Commission, since the Commissioners are the sole judges of the credibility of witnesses and weight of evidence.

Reteuna v. Ind. Com. 185 P. 535
55 Utah 258
Leventis v. Ind. Com. 35 P. (2d) 770
84 Utah 174
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In fact, this Court has said that it may not in
compensation cases direct what inference shall be drawn
from the evidence, even when there is no conflict.

Parker v. Ind. Com. 5 P. (2d) 573
78 Utah 509
Appellant's brief has cited a number of cases which
are in point only because they involve disability caused
by arthritis, that is, in point because they deal with
the same systemic disorder. The books are full of such
cases. In fact the American Digest system devotes Section 1525 of its Workmen's Compensation topic entirely
to such cases. Naturally these cases encompass various
phases of legal learning applicable to arthritic disability,
but there is no rule of law to be gleaned from them in
any wise helpful to Appellant's position. The only Utah
case is one in which this Court determines that the evidence is insufficient to support findings of the Industrial Commission that claimant was suffering from sacroiliac arthritis, resulting from accidental injury.

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Ind. Com.
278 P. 60, 74 Utah 170
For what it may be worth, we cite two of the cases
from other jurisdictions. They have some value because
they come from stat-es in which, as in this, the findings
of the Commission may not be questioned if supported
by competent evidence. In the case of

Duchant v. Oliver Iron Mng. Co.
256 N. W. (Minn.) 905
the Court says, quoting from the syllabus:
''Evidence that employee's disability
was due to progress of arthritic condition
10
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of back and not to accident supported Industrial Commission's finding that employee was not entitled to compensation.''
In the case of

Jackson v. Iowa Telephone Co., 179 N. W.
(Iowa) 849, at page 851
the court says :
''We said in the Hanson case, supra,
at page 824 of 176 N. W. that there was
'some evidence sustaining the Industrial
Commissioner's conclusion that the disease
was lighted up or accelerated by the accidental slipping of the hammer from the
chisel and striking complainant. * * *
This being true, the courts may not interfere with such finding,' citing the Griffith
case.
Such is the situation here, except
that the commissioner arrived at the opposite conclusion. The rule ought to be, and
is, the same in either event. Any other rule
would encourage litigants to bring the matter first before the arbitration committee,
then to the Industrial Commissioner, then
to the district court, then to the Supreme
Court, for the determination of the credibility of the witnesses and the preponderance of the evidence, hoping that somewhere along the line a tribun~l could he
found that would differ, as the district
court did, with the findings of the committee and commissioner, the tribunals established by law for the determination of such
questions ; so that instead of simplifying
the procedure, and lessening litigation and
expense, it would become more complicated
and more expensive.''
Appellant's brief rather specializes on Washington
and Louisiana cases. These are in no sense helpful
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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since they are based on statutes entirely different from
our own. As the Washington Court says in the case of

Johnston v. Dept. of Labor and Industries
2 P. (2d) 67
quoting from the syllabus:
"On appeal to court from compensation award, court may determine questions
of fact and modify or reverse award, in
accordance with findings (Rem. Com. Stat.
Supp. 1927, Sec. 7697)."
In Louisiana trial is by the court, not by Commission, and the Louisiana court says that the trial judge's
conclusion in employer's liability case will be accepted
where the evidence is evenly divided.

Baugh v. Scotland Lumber Co.
5 La. App. 348
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MAY HOLD HEARING
BY REFEREE
Appellant attacks the jurisdiction of the Commission to appoint and conduct its hearing by referee. At
the outset we remark that Appellant is now violating
the well known rule of law prohibiting the raising on
appeal of questions not presented below. In the case of

U jevich v. Inspiration Cons. Copper
Co., 33 P. (2d) 599,
the Arizona court says, quoting from the syllabus:
''Objection for first time on appeal
that Industrial Commission, after remand
of case by Supreme Court, did not have a
12
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formal hearing to determine matters required by mandate, held too late.''
To the same effect we cite :

Benton ]fining Co. v. Ind. Com.
151 N. E. (Ill.) 520
Schaefer v. Lowell-Krekeler Co.
49 S. W. (2d) (Mo.) 209
Utah does not seem to have passed upon this question in connection with Industrial Commission cases,
but it is, of course, elementary as a principle applicable
to appeals.

Malstrom v. Lund, 185 P. 1109,
55 Utah 353
Summit County v. Gustaveson,
54 P. 977, 18 Utah 351
Even the Utah Statute seems to contemplate that all
questions shall be presented first to the Commission.

Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 42-1-24
The question of the right of the Commission to
use examiners or referee was definitely passed on by
this Court in the case of

Utah Copper Co. v. Ind. Com.
193 P. 24, 57 Utah 118
Certain sections of the statute referred to in the above
case have been slightly modified but are still substantially the same. Compiled laws of Utah, 1917, Section
3100, and Laws of Utah, 1919, Section 3099 are now combined in Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 as Section 42-2-5,
13
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which was in tnrn amended in Laws of Utah 1939, at
page 74. The Court, in the above case, also refers to
Section 3149, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, which is
now embodied in the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933,
Section 42-1-82.
It might also be well to keep in mind that this matter comes before this Court on certiorari and the scope
of review must be considered. In the case of

Mill v. Brown, 88 P. 609
31 Utah 473,
the Court says, quoting from the syllabus :
''While, on certiorari to review a judgment, the question of the judge's right to
hold the office, whether by reason of the invalidity of the law under which he was
chosen or appointed, or because of his want
of the proper qualifications, cannot be considered, the question whether the law under
which he acts, and on which the validity of
his acts depends, is unconstitutional may
be considered.''
Appellant's brief gave to this question summary t_reatment and we believe it has been sufficiently covered
herein.
In conclusion we submit that the. decision of the
Commission is amply supported by the record.
Respectfully submitted,

FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT & MABEY,
Attorneys for Respondents . .
14
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